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INTRODUCTION 
For 20 years, online service providers have relied upon an 
established and developed body of law interpreting Section 230 of the 
federal Communications Decency Act (“Section 230” or the “CDA”), 
which delineates the extent to which they can or cannot be responsible for 
the content and activities of third-party users. The Court of Appeals, 
however, broke with decades of case law interpreting the CDA as a broad 
immunity, and instead adopted a so-called “plain language interpretation” 
which gave it free license to ignore virtually every other court that has 
interpreted the same statutory language. P-App 001-024 (“Ruling”) ¶ 3. 
Although CCIA takes no position here on whether Defendants ultimately 
fall within Section 230, this Court’s review is needed to ensure that the 
proper interpretation of this vital immunity applies in this case and in other 
cases involving online service providers in this State. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH VIRTUALLY 
EVERY COURT IN THE UNITED STATES THAT HAS 
APPLIED THE CDA 
A. Congress Determined That Traditional Standards of 
Publisher and Distributor Liability Should Not Apply in 
the Internet Context 
The CDA “immunizes providers of interactive computer services 
against liability arising from content created by third parties.” Jones v. 
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014). 
Section 230(c)(1) mandates that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1). Subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, the statute 
expressly bars any state law claims that run afoul of this directive, 
providing that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 
Id. § 230(e)(3). 
“Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of 
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference 
in the medium to a minimum.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
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330 (4th Cir. 1997). Congress understood that if online service providers 
were subject to traditional publisher or distributor liability simply because 
third-party information is posted to, or accessible through, their services, 
they would be forced to investigate each and every notice of potentially 
unlawful content. “Although this might be feasible for the traditional print 
publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services 
would create an impossible burden in the Internet context.” Id. at 333. 
“[A]bsent federal statutory protection, interactive computer services would 
essentially have two choices: (1) employ an army of highly trained 
monitors to patrol (in real time) each chatroom, message board, and blog to 
screen any message that one could label defamatory, or (2) simply avoid 
such a massive headache and shut down these fora. Either option would 
profoundly chill Internet speech.” DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529 
(E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2007). 
B. Section 230 Immunizes Online Service Providers from 
Claims Arising from Content Posted by Third-Parties 
“Both state and federal courts around the country have generally 
interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress’s 
policy choice … not to deter harmful online speech through the … route of 
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other 
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parties’ potentially injurious messages[.]” Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of 
N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288 (2011) (emphasis added; citations omitted; 
collecting cases). While defamation is the prototypical claim associated 
with Section 230, countless courts have interpreted the CDA to establish a 
broad (but not unlimited) immunity against “any cause of action that would 
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service.” Jones, 755 F.3d at 406-07 (emphasis added; citations 
omitted; collecting cases). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc.: 
[M]any causes of action might be premised on the publication 
or speaking of what one might call “information content.” A 
provider of information services might get sued for violating 
anti-discrimination laws, for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and ordinary negligence, for false light, or 
even for negligent publication of advertisements that cause 
harm to third parties. Thus, what matters is not the name of 
the cause of action … what matters is whether the cause of 
action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as 
the “publisher or speaker” of content provided by another.  
570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added; citations 
omitted). 
Under this standard, virtually every court to have interpreted the 
CDA has held that Section 230 bars “lawsuits seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
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functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or 
alter content” that they did not themselves create. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; 
accord, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 407 (immunizing a service provider’s 
exercise of “traditional editorial functions” goes to the “core” of Section 
230); see also, e.g., Universal Commc’ns. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 
418-22 (1st Cir. 2007) (barring claim that website’s registration process and 
link structure prompted third-party postings in violation of Florida 
securities law); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120-29 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016) (barring claim that Twitter contributed to unlawful acts 
committed by persons who created accounts on its service); Gonzalez v. 
Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (barring 
claim that Google violated federal statute by permitting third-parties to post 
videos inciting unlawful conduct on its YouTube service); Cohen v. 
Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 155-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (barring 
various tort claims that Facebook allowed third-parties to use its platform to 
post offensive content); Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, No. 17-CV-932 (VEC), 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12346, at *11-23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018) (barring 
claims that features of web-based dating application failed to prevent 
plaintiff from being harassed by other users). 
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C. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Section 230 in This Case 
1. The Decision Below Misinterprets the CDA as a 
Narrow Immunity That Cannot Protect the “Design 
and Operation” of a Website 
The Court of Appeals engaged in an idiosyncratic interpretation of 
Section 230, finding only a “narrow scope of immunity” applied directly to 
user communications themselves. Ruling ¶¶ 27, 34, 42, 47 & n.5. The Court 
discarded Section 230 in this case because Plaintiffs do not (in the Court’s 
view) “seek to hold Armslist liable for publishing another’s information 
content. Instead, the claims seek to hold Armslist liable for its own alleged 
actions in designing and operating its website in ways that caused injuries 
to Daniel,” i.e., by “facilitat[ing] illegal firearms purchases” between third-
parties communicating on the Armslist site. Id. ¶¶ 3, 51-52. 
This logic has been rejected by every court to have considered it. 
Courts consistently hold that “Section 230(c)(1) is implicated not only by 
claims that explicitly point to third party content but also by claims which, 
though artfully pleaded to avoid direct reference, implicitly require recourse 
to that content to establish liability or implicate a defendant’s role, broadly 
defined, in publishing or excluding third party communications.” Cohen, 
252 F. Supp. 3d at 156 (emphasis added) (barring claims that Facebook 
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“contributed to” unlawful conduct committed by persons who signed up for 
accounts and posted content on its service, because “Facebook’s role in 
publishing [third-party] content is thus an essential causal element of the 
claims”); see also, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that CDA does not cover a website’s 
“conduct” in facilitating the posting of unlawful confidential telephone 
information, “rather than for the content of the information,” because 
ultimately the website “would not have violated the FTCA had it not 
‘published’ the confidential telephonic information”); Fields, 217 F. Supp. 
3d at 1118 (barring claims that Twitter provided “material support” to 
third-parties who signed up for accounts on its service and used it to incite 
violence, because “no amount of careful pleading can change the fact that, 
in substance, plaintiffs aim to hold Twitter liable as a publisher or speaker 
of [third-party’s] hateful rhetoric”); Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1164-65 
(rejecting argument that “provision of material support” to third-parties 
who engage in violent activity “does not depend on the characterization of 
Google as the publisher or speaker” of third-party content, because “[t]his 
argument essentially tries to divorce [a third-party’s] offensive content 
from the ability to post such content”). 
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Virtually without exception, Section 230 has been held to govern 
claims that “address the structure and operation of the [defendant’s] 
website, that is, [defendant’s] decision about how to treat postings. Features 
such as these, which reflect choices about what content can appear on the 
website and in what form, are editorial choices that fall within the purview 
of traditional publisher functions.” Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 
12, 16-17, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (barring claim that defendant structured 
website to facilitate unlawful transactions); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software 
Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524, at *18-19 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to “plead around § 
230(c)(1) immunity by basing their claims on the website’s tools, rather 
than the website operator’s role as a publisher of the third-party content”); 
Herrick, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12346, at *17-18, *20 (“Herrick’s claim 
that Grindr is liable because it failed to incorporate adequate protections 
against impersonating or fake accounts is just another way of asserting that 
Grindr is liable because it fails to police and remove impersonating 
content…. [T]hese features (or the lack of additional capabilities) are … 
exactly the sort of ‘editorial choices’ that are a function of being a 
publisher.”); Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422 (“Lycos’s decision not to reduce 
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misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial 
decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a 
particular posting.”); Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1124 (“Twitter’s decisions 
to structure and operate itself as a platform ... reflect choices about what 
[third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what form. Where such 
choices form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim, section 230(c)(1) applies.”) 
(citations omitted); Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1166 (Google immunized 
from claim that “functionality” of its YouTube service “enhance[d] [third-
party’s] ability to conduct [unlawful] operations”); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256-58 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(defendant immunized from claim that “structure and design of its website” 
facilitated tortious content); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 156-57 
(“[D]ecisions as to the ‘structure and operation’ of a website ... fall within 
Section 230(c)(1)’s protection[.]”).  
Here, as plaintiffs did in the cases cited above, the Court of Appeals 
tried to divorce the “design and operation” of Defendants’ website from 
claims based on the content posted on that website by third-parties. But the 
allegations in this case exemplify the logical fallacy of that distinction. 
Plaintiffs’ theory is that an online service “is liable for designing and 
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operating its website in a way that encouraged prohibited sales.” Ruling ¶ 
35. Its “features” allegedly enabled third-party users to connect and 
communicate with one another on Defendants’ website. Id.; see also id. ¶ 
13. The seller posted an advertisement on the site, and the buyer reached 
out to and conversed with the seller on the site. Id. ¶ 19. As such, Plaintiffs 
are seeking to hold a website liable for its role in facilitating 
communications between users of that site. Id. Without those 
communications, there could be no claim against the website operators. 
At bottom, then, Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the notion that a 
website did not do enough to stop users from posting advertisements that 
may result in unlawful sales. Such allegations seek to hold an online service 
liable, in a direct way, for the choices it made about what user-generated 
information should or should not appear on its site, and in what form. But 
Section 230 applies to any such claims that “can be boiled down to the 
failure of an interactive computer service to edit or block user-generated 
content that it believes was tendered for posting online, as that is the very 
activity Congress sought to immunize by passing the section.” Fair Hous. 
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 n.32 (9th Cir. 
2008).  
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2. The Court of Appeals Should Have, But Did Not, 
Apply the “Material Contribution Test” to Determine 
Whether Defendants are “Information Content 
Providers” Under the CDA 
Section 230 immunity is not unlimited. “[A]n interactive computer 
service that is also an ‘information content provider’ of certain content is 
not immune from liability arising from publication of that content.” 
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199. Accordingly, instead of discarding CDA 
immunity outright based on a false distinction between a website’s 
“content” and “design,” the Court of Appeals should have—but did not—
follow established law to determine whether Defendants are themselves 
“information content provider[s]” and therefore “responsible, in whole or in 
part” for creating or developing unlawful activity on their site. 47 U.S.C. § 
230(f)(3). 
Under the well-established “material contribution” test, “a website 
helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to 
section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the 
conduct.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167-68. Importantly, however, a 
“material contribution to the alleged illegality of the content does not mean 
merely taking action that is necessary to the display of allegedly illegal 
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content. Rather, it means being responsible for what makes the displayed 
content allegedly unlawful.” Jones, 755 F.3d at 410 (emphasis added). 
The service must have contributed to the illegality intentionally, 
such as in Roommates.com where the defendant (which had been sued for 
soliciting discriminatory information from users in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act) “designed its system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as 
to limit the results of each search, and to force users to participate in its 
discriminatory process.” 521 F.3d at 1167. By contrast, merely “providing 
neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not 
amount to ‘development’ for purposes of the immunity exception.” Id. at 
1169.  
For example, in FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit held that “a 
service provider is ‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content 
only if it in some way specifically encourages development of what is 
offensive about the content.” 570 F.3d at 1199. The court held that the 
defendant, which had actively solicited and paid for confidential telephone 
records to be posted and sold on its website, was “not ‘neutral’ with respect 
to generating offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to 
generate such content.” Id. at 1201 (emphasis added). 
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Courts around the country have applied these principles in a variety 
of circumstances, including in cases where the “design and operation” of a 
website has allegedly facilitated an unlawful transaction between users of 
that service. See, e.g., Dyroff, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524, at *28 
(“Ultimate Software’s functionalities are neutral tools that do not transform 
Ultimate Software into an ‘information content provider,’ even if the tools 
were used to facilitate unlawful activities on the site. Ultimate Software’s 
policy about anonymity may have allowed illegal conduct, and the neutral 
tools facilitated user communications, but these website functionalities do 
not ‘create’ or ‘develop’ information, even in part.”) (emphasis added; 
citations omitted); J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714, 
717-18 (Wash. 2015) (“It is important to ascertain whether in fact 
Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex trafficking to determine 
whether Backpage is subject to suit under the CDA ….”) (citing 
Roommates.com). 
While CCIA takes no position here on the outcome of the “material 
contribution” test when properly applied to the facts of this case, the Court 
of Appeals departed from established law by rejecting Section 230 simply 
because, in its view, Plaintiffs do not seek to hold Defendants responsible 
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for the specific content posted by their users. The Court’s failure to apply 
the “material contribution” test misunderstood the CDA’s important 
immunity, broke with two decades of consistent case law, and threatens to 
substantially erode the protections that Section 230 provides to all service 
providers in Wisconsin and throughout the United States—not just 
Defendants. 
II. AT MINIMUM, THE DECISION BELOW CREATES A 
CONFLICT OF LAW WITH STATEWIDE AND 
NATIONWIDE IMPLICATIONS 
At minimum, there is no question that a stark conflict of law merits 
review by this Court. Indeed, the Court of Appeals itself admitted that its 
idiosyncratic reading of Section 230 conflicts with authority throughout the 
country. The Court acknowledges “case law that effectively construes the 
Act to provide ‘broad immunity’ for claims that rest on allegations of 
activities by creators and operators of websites that those courts deem to be 
‘publishing’ activities,” but ultimately concludes that those cases “do not, 
in our view, come to grips with the plain language in the Act.” Ruling ¶¶ 
34, 36, 48-51.  
Even the cases the Court considered “persuasive” do not support its 
analysis. The Court cherry-picked dicta from those opinions, but ignored 
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their ultimate analyses and outcomes. See id. ¶¶ 45-46. For instance, the 
Court relies heavily upon a concurring opinion in J.S. v. Village Voice 
Media Holdings, even though the majority endorses and applies the 
“material contribution” test to allegations that an online service facilitated 
unlawful transactions between users. 359 P.3d at 717-18. It also invokes 
Barnes, which found that a defendant’s contractual promise to remove 
content may waive the CDA safe harbor, but otherwise endorsed a broad 
immunity covering “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions,” such as 
“reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from 
publication third-party content.” 570 F.3d at 1101-02.  
CONCLUSION 
The ruling below stands alone amongst decades of established case 
law and creates a significant loophole in Section 230. The practical 
consequence is that countless plaintiffs with creative lawyers will come to 
Wisconsin to exploit that loophole, to pursue claims against online service 
providers that have consistently been understood as prohibited in every 
other state. This Court should review it. 
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